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POLITICS IN TRAVAIL
ONL of the pleasanter aspects of the inaugural lecture is the tradition of paying tribute to pioneers (an emotive word in this part of the world), and I am glad 
to pay tribute to the work of Professor F. M. G. Willson, the 
first occupant of the Chair of Government at the University 
College of Rhodesia, a scholar of note and a peerless ad­
ministrator.
The Chair of Government did not become. I am glad to 
say. redundant; it merely faded away, or rather it was whisked 
away by Academic Board Fiat. The subject underwent a 
metamorphosis and became political science. Hence, while 
the Chair is not new. its claims are different and. I would 
say. more difficult.
The object of this lecture is to justify the activities of the 
political scientist and. to a lesser extent, those of the politi­
cians. This may not be a simple task, for only recently at 
the Conservative Political Centre's national summer school, 
held at Christchurch. Oxford. Professor Brian Chapman de­
clared. “Political scientists are the only professional men u'ho 
have killed more people than doctors. " 1 This macabre con­
cept of our function is universally shared (though it is sad 
to see that even professors of this subject have accepted it). 
Shakespeare put into the mouth of King Lear his view of 
politicians -the object of much of the political scientist’s 
study:
“Get thee glass eyes:
And. like a scurvy politician seem 
To see the things thou dost not."
(Lear, Act IV. Sc. VI.)
Moreover, Swift speaking of Brobdingnag showed his scorn 
of anything political when he asserted. “And he gave it for 
his opinion that whoever could make two ears of corn and 
two blades of grass grow upon a spot of ground where only 
one grew before, would deserve better of mankind and do 
more essential service to his country than the whole race of 
politicians together."
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Again, when President Johnson declared himself no longer 
a candidate for the presidency of the United States of 
America, satisfaction was discernible from almost all quar­
ters. One commentator declared grandly that the President 
had taken the presidency out of politics--as if the presidency 
could be divorced from politics. Moreover, a few years ago 
in the South African Parliament, one Member accused another 
Member of “preaching pure politics" and argued that Parlia­
ment was no place for politics.
Sometimes the general distaste is couched in terms of quaint 
romanticism and this will even trickle across the Iron Curtain. 
Mr. Yevgeni Yevtushenko in a letter to the New York Times 
said. “1 should not like that blunt soldiers’ boots of war and 
mucky politicians’ shoes should crush the snow-like purity of 
feelings between our peoples.” Were that international poli­
tical problems were soluble in this grand way. Of course, 
General de Gaulle has the last word. With his supreme con­
tempt for politicians he declared, “As usual, 1 have against 
me the bourgeoisie, the officers and the diplomatists and for 
me. only the people who take the Metro." The French have 
a word for it—depolitisation which means scepticism of, 
if not withdrawal from, politics. Hence they lake to the 
streets rather than to the hustings.
We constantly hear pleas from all sides to take sport out 
of politics, and education out of politics, and religion out of 
politics . . . and now it appears that they want to take 
politics out of politics. Some years ago I went on my way 
to a tutorial in Natal University. I fell in behind two students 
and one of them asked the other where he was going. A 
silence descended on the first when he was told that the second 
student was going to a politics tutorial. “That's where you 
learn to make plastic bombs, isn't it?” eventually retorted 
the unbeliever. Such is the travail of the political academic. 
Occasional compensations exist, however, one of which 1 
treasure came from the student who described the Opening 
of Parliament as the Oueen’s Purgative.
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The politicians too seem disturbed. Mr. Jo Grimmond 
said in tones of final desperation. “Apart from gossip and 
jokes about George Brown, party political argument is dead.” 
Mr. Christopher Mayhew asserted, with unpleasant frankness. 
“A certain degree of humbug is inevitable in politics, but the 
amount required of us now to keep the party system going is 
becoming excessive.” Even the Speaker of the House of 
Commons has been worried about this, for he recently said. 
“It is not out of order to accuse one side of the House of 
humbug, but it may be discourteous.” President Harry S. 
Truman said a propos the slings and arrows directed at poli­
ticians, “If you can’t stand the heat, you’d better get out of 
the kitchen.”
There is politics everywhere, however. It is embedded in 
those nursery rhymes which we teach our children:
“Sing a song of sixpence 
A pocket full of rye 
Four and twenty blackbirds 
Baked in a pie.
When the pie was opened.
The birds began to sing.
Wasn't this a dainty dish 
To set before the King?”
The story of the Rye House plot and the twenty-four sus­
pended bishops are happily far away from us now. Revolu­
tion in the nursery; here children are taught about the im­
pecunious King James, his counting house, the papist queen 
in her parlour, the maid in the garden; was it Nell Gwyn 
whose nose was pecked off by a blackbird bishop?
What of goosey goosey gander wandering upstairs and 
downstairs, not to mention his lady Queen's chamber? The 
old man thrown so violently downstairs who couldn’t say his 
prayers was. so I understand, that famous Whig dissenter. 
Earl of Shaftesbury.
Hence, it would appear to most people that the term poli­
tics is synonymous with, variously, intrigue, sabotage, un­
mitigated partisanship and, for all we know, original sin. It
may conic as a shock to Rhodesians to learn that there was 
a political monk by the name of John of Salisbury writing 
in the twelfth century who preached tyrannicide. Whenever 
a scapegoat needs to be found for the foibles of men, it is at 
hand, it is to be found “in politics." Perhaps the cruellest 
blow of all has been to assert that problems of race confron­
tation are “political" problems. It must be admitted that 
Mr. Hnoch Powell has not assisted in this regard.
Out of all. this babbling and mumbling, political scientists 
have attempted to construct a quieter language, one which 
attempts to study an organised body of knowledge about 
human behaviour, as it relates to public affairs, which scholars 
have validated, or consider susceptible of validation, by 
rigorous and systematic examination.- Politics is an art, 
political science is science, but unfortunately the art had not 
had much help from the science. Most of (he vulgar criti­
cisms made by the unthinking man on the Clapham omnibus 
or the Avondale special can be treated with the contempt 
they deserve, although it gets a little tedious for the professor 
of political science to accept all the old-fashioned glances 
and the frigid looks from all sorts and conditions of men and 
women when he confesses his profession. The travail which 
is his lot is yet more difficult to endure when it comes from 
presumed educated men whom one might expect to know 
better. Einstein was surely right when he said that politics 
is much more difficult than physics.
It must nonetheless be admitted that there is a considerable 
sense of disenchantment with both politicians and the poli­
tical process. A study of the British Press at the end of 
1967 brought forward the revelation that the political process 
(and with it the constitutional way of doing things) was 
under severe attack. One newspaper declared in looking 
forward to 1968. “. . . there are alarming signs that more 
and more people— the young and idealistic businessmen and 
industrialists are opting out from the political process.”1 
One other newspaper spoke of. “The widespread public dis­
illusion with politics and politicians. . . .” One prominent
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British public servant in 1967 advocated the running of 
Britain as a huge business corporation with a few political 
nuances thrown in to jazz it up a bit.
Of course one understands the low state of British political 
morale in 1968. Students of political science, however, are 
in a situation where they must defend themselves from their 
friends too, forgetting such comments as those made by Mr. 
Nigel Birch who, opposing a guillotine motion in the House 
of Commons, once remarked that the academic study of 
politics was becoming “one of the growth industries.” Indeed, 
the academic study of politics is not growing all that much. 
Thus, in 1966, in the whole of the U.S.A.. only 2 .2 5 VJ< of all 
doctorates awarded were in political science.1
The idea of political science may startle some people whose 
notions of what science is are based upon the physical sciences. 
Can we therefore legitimately speak of a science of politics? 
Is there a science of politics? The answer to this question is 
that politics can be highly scientific in a narrow sense, but 
in the broadest sense it is the most unscientific human activity. 
In the narrow sense in which many people regard the subject, 
particularly in the U.S. today, political science is a highly 
scientific enterprise. These people argue that much, if not 
the bulk of, political activity is quantifiable, amenable to 
mathematical manipulation, and. even, at times, predictable. 
Hence, it can be argued, and it is frequently argued, that 
political science fulfills all the prerequisites for its establish­
ment as a scientific discipline in its own right. If this is the 
case, the tests for regarding politics as a science should be 
the same tests as those which any scientist would enunciate.
Firstly, the science should be concerned with the acquisition 
of some body of knowledge which the average man cannot 
produce for himself without guidance. Secondly, the science 
should consist of a corpus of factual knowledge applied to 
some given field and distinguishable from guess-work, intuitive 
art and aesthetics. Thirdly, it should be reasonably consistent 
in prediction, which means that there is a possibility that
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experiments can be repeated. Science, we may conclude, 
characteristically describes a “sophisticated body of know­
ledge. or a highly-organised method of obtaining knowledge."'
Political scientists would be more than bold to claim that 
their activities are wholly scientific in this sense, but most of 
them would claim that they are involved with scientific 
method, whose characteristics are reasonable detachment and 
absence of dogma, continuity, sincerity and systematic treat­
ment and also unfailing devotion to accuracy. In practice, 
the Achilles heel of political science is prediction. The grave­
yard of all our attempts to predict is to be seen in the field 
of history— whether this is to be found in the promised land 
of More’s Utopia or in the prophecies of Marx. Nevertheless 
within small areas of study the psephologically-inclined poli­
tical scientist can expect a quite staggering degree of accuracy.
The most obvious example which can be quoted relates to 
the public opinion poll. It is quite possible to predict with 
a high degree of accuracy (to within 17c to 27c) who will 
win an election. This fact (if it is a fact) depends upon 
knowledge of a number of other facts, such as knowing that 
a particular area is liable to be in the pockets of a given 
political party (the so-called “safe” seal).
We know, for example, the proportion of “safe” seats in 
Great Britain and on this basis we know fairly accurately that 
most general elections in Britain are fought over the so-called 
marginal seats. In some ways the general election is be­
coming less significant because we know from the polls which 
are conducted by Dr. Gallup and others the degree of the 
popularity which the government of the day enjoys.
There is thus growing up a whole new battery of concepts 
within the orbit of that discipline which we call psephology." 
We can dissect an election in such a way that our chances 
of prediction are quite high once we take account of all the 
variables. These variables include:
1. The candidate, who is himself regarded merely as a party 
man and is worth a few hundred votes at the most. Hence,
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however shining his personality, his value is severely limited 
except in terms of the party whose label he bears. There 
are, of course, many honest exceptions to this rule, but it 
remains true nevertheless that his value is that of a human 
political tool.
2. The campaign. The psephologist frequently argues that 
the effort expended in an election may largely be a waste of 
time. Indeed, it has been shown that only one voter in seven 
had not finally made up his mind by the start of the campaign.
3. Constituency organisation and local party officials do 
not have much influence apart from making the campaign 
easier to document and perhaps from getting postal votes in 
marginal seats.
4. Few people change their minds as a result of canvassing, 
and the amount of false information given to potential can­
didates by electors may only be a measure of the gullibility 
of the canvassers.
5. The influence of television around politics has been 
hugely overestimated. Television simply informs us of the 
imminence of an election and nothing more.
6. The election manifesto appears to be virtually useless, 
and it has been shown that the information therein contained 
does not affect the outcome of an election.
We also know that the “image” (to use a Madison Avenue 
term) is in fact all-important. People see political activity 
in terms of mental pictures, and “images" are highly signifi­
cant. Images relate to what a party is supposed to stand for. 
Hence while nobody reads policy statements, everybody senses 
images.
It is important in this connection to distinguish between 
“images” and “issues." We know people will vote for an 
“image” while they will not necessarily support an “issue.” 
In the South African general election in 1966 (which I fol­
lowed very carefully) few people understood the Bantustan 
concept, but they voted nevertheless for the Nationalists. It 
is a reasonable assumption to make that had they understood
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the Bantustan concept they might have voted for the United 
Party, but the “image” of the Nationalists, strong, stern and 
unyielding, was a stronger emotion than that of the vaguer 
United Party. Again, in the London suburb of Greenwich, 
a survey demonstrated that only three out of ten persons 
asked could offer any reasonable comment about party poli­
tics, and comments, in fact, whether critical or not, tended 
to be personal or “casually biographical.”
In British politics as far as the “issues” are concerned, there 
is considerable overlap in reality between the parties, so 
much so that Sir Ivor Jennings once said. “Among the leaders 
of the three major parties there is so much common ground 
that if they changed parties the results would be hardly 
noticeable." Nevertheless, as far as the “images" are con­
cerned, people imagine that they are poles apart and the 
cloth cap and bowler are still the ultimate in political thinking 
for the majority of the British voters. In reality, the cloth 
cap and the bowler have married, producing a bizarre head- 
gear recognisable as a devalued trilby.
All these studies have assisted us in discovering what are 
the principles which impel the electorate to think as it does. 
What, however, is most extraordinary and paradoxical is that 
the science of voting behaviour constitutes an attempt to 
establish rational laws on the basis of irrational voting habit. 
Moreover, it is clear that producing political “laws” is a 
hazardous affair, because one may produce a fact (a “value- 
impregnated fact,” to use a most infelicitous phrase), which 
contains within it a value judgment. Thus, we all know that 
one manual worker in three supports the Conservatives, and 
it has been suggested even that this is the reason for British 
political stability. The “deferential” vote has been the subject 
of much discussion and political scientists are hard-pressed 
to explain its full significance. Moreover, the manipulation 
of votes is still in the pre-Newtonian era; if there are levers 
to be pulled which will persuade voters to change their minds, 
the psephologists are still trying to discover them—but indeed 
which scientists are not awaiting the dawning of some brave
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breakthrough? Money does not seem to be the answer, 
because although the Conservatives spent about £440,000 
on half-page advertisements featuring Sir Alec Douglas-Home 
between January and April. 1964. in the same period his 
popularity rating fell from 58 to 48 per cent.
Again. Wilson's rating fell from 71 to 63 per cent, between 
May. 1963. and May, 1964. a period during which Labour 
devoted the largest part of its advertising campaign to boost­
ing its leader.7 It seems just possible that voters are more 
influenced by what political leaders do rather than how they 
are presented. The conclusion of all these studies appears 
to be that, as yet. political science has some way to go before 
the day when we can advise politicians what levers they should 
pull in order to obtain which votes, in order to obtain a victory. 
Clearly the nagging fear is that image-makers may in fact 
take over from politicians. This fear is as yet unjustified, 
but the day may very well come when elections will be super­
fluous because the computers can do it much better than the 
electors. When this happens we will be able to speak of 
“governmejit of the computer, by the computer, for the 
computer.” In fact, politicians are just as frightened of com­
puters as the public because they see here a threat to their 
own position. They want to believe that they know better 
than the machine; they want to believe that they understand 
the mystic processes of communing with the voters, and they 
lend to resent the intrusion of the professionals: the techno­
logists of political and public opinion are consequently under­
utilised. Here is a case where political science is too scientific 
for the politicians.
Psephology. as one writer said, produces dyspepsia, but it 
is at least as scientific as one might hope for. and it can 
account at the moment for only a small area of political 
interest. Psephological phenomena and the language of 
quantitative empiricism represent only a small area of poli­
tical interest. There are large areas of political activity not 
amenable to this sort of analysis. In this case, noumena.
which is the qualitative aspect of political science, and there­
fore not amenable to measurement, take over.
Political science falls short of being a formal empirical 
science, for to use the language of Kant, it does not succeed 
in constructing a system of synthetic a priori propositions. 
Hvcn the acolytes of political science agree to ask the question 
of Bertrand de Jouvenal: “Political science stands alone in 
its lack of agreed ‘elements.' There are no basic concepts 
simple enough to allow of only one meaning, therefore con­
veying exactly the same significance to all and confidently 
handled by everyone; there are no simple relations, acknow­
ledged by all to form the smallest components of complex 
systems, and commonly used in the building of models devised 
to simulate the intricacies of real situations. Does such a 
deficiency pertain to the nature of this discipline?" The 
answer to the question must be in the affirmative.
Perhaps we might consider the famous political proposition 
of Lord Acton, “power corrupts, absolute power corrupts 
absolutely." This proposition has all the appearance of being 
empirically verifiable, but what is interesting about it is. why 
ask the proposition to be forwarded? It was not to be for­
warded for verification, but rather for the noumenal purpose 
of advancing an ideal derived from a normative conviction- 
the liberal view that “he governs best who governs least." 
Plence it is not possible to posit and verify the wider laws of 
politics as one can verify the laws of the other purer sciences. 
To try might be to invite travail.
The constructor of a science of politics is therefore faced 
with a number of superhuman obstacles. He must firstly try 
to construct political laws and face the prospect that they 
will be disproved or their basis shown to be unverifiable 
assumptions though we must accept that the natural scientist 
also faces these difficulties.
Machiavelli. for example, decided that “man's nature, 
while actually good and bad. had to be treated for the pur­
poses of politics as bad." There is clearly a collision here
between Machiavelli's raliunalism and his empiricism. How­
ever. the strict scientist might object on the grounds that 
Machiavelli thought the facts confirmed his a priori postu­
lates. but he neither drew his postulates from the facts nor 
tested the facts which supposedly tested the postulates.
Hence, it follows, secondly, that the political scientist must 
forge new propositions and yet always assume as did Hobbes 
or Machiavelli something fundamental about human nature, 
or remember the assumptions of. say. Adam Smith, that there 
was a harmonious balance of nature which gave rise to 
economic man. or bear in mind, as did St. Thomas Aquinas, 
the rational and moral nature of man.
The core of our travail lies in the fact that the quantitative 
and qualitative elements of the subject form an imperfect mix. 
One can understand the scorn with which the notion of a 
political science is greeted by people both outside and inside 
the profession. Ignoring the external pressures, there are 
difficulties at home. Within the profession the behavioural- 
ists. logical positivists and their fellow travellers have 
attempted to “refo rm "  those of us they regard as woolly- 
minded. but still imagine that there can be a science without 
political laboratories.
The late Sir Ernest Barker once said that political science 
was a trilogy. “It is the theory of the State: but it is also a 
theory of morals and a theory of law. It contains two sub­
jects which have since been removed from its scope and 
treated as separate spheres.” "’ Such generalisations would be 
unpopular today because Barker grew up. taught and died 
under the shadow of Victorian liberal values—-as these were 
understood in the University of Cambridge, and not in the 
age of co m p u terised  p o litics.
What Barker called “political science" would no longer 
appeal to the tough, rigorous technicians in the camp of the 
behaviouralists and others. One of the fashions to which 
some of the political scientists have attached themselves is 
that of behaviouralism (to be distinguished from its American
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counterpart, without the “u" or not. according to taste). 
In origin, as associated with J. B. Watson, it is a psychological 
concept which was adopted “to help exorcise from scientific 
research all reference to such subjective data as purposes, 
intentions, desires or ideas.”
Only those observations obtained through the use of the 
sense organs or mechanical equipment were to be admitted 
as data. Observable behaviour generated by external stimuli 
rather than information about the subjective state of mind 
of the person being observed, were to constitute the subject 
matter of research.
The original behaviouristic paradigm. S-R (stimulus-re­
sponse). has yielded to the more intelligible one of S-O-R 
(stimulus-organism-response) in which feelings, motivations 
and all the other aspects of the subjective awareness and 
reaction of the organism are taken into account as potentially 
useful data." One may ask what crimes are committed in 
the name of science -we hear talk about test instruments, 
survey methods, statistical analysis, experiments with small 
groups in social science laboratories, mathematical models.1" 
I have heard that behaviour therapy has proved very useful 
in preventing enuresis (bed-wetting). We might, therefore, 
describe the behaviourist approach as political bed-wetting: 
when the voter hears the bell, he reacts appropriately, reach­
ing for his Chamber of Deputies. The behaviouralists 
constitute an impressive force in many North American 
universities and in one of these, to my certain knowledge, 
they almost brought a university to a standstill. It has not 
always been easy to understand them, though one may wish 
to sympathise with their objectives, but the extremists amongst 
them might be described as politically illiterate numerates.
We should not. however, write off the valuable contribu­
tions of sensible psychologists like Professor Eysenck whose 
work has been of considerable value. He has assisted us in 
jettisoning the old. tired, hackneyed cliches Left and Right, 
which, as a metaphor of political structure, obscures at least 
as much as it explains. The straight linear implications of
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Left. Centre, Right are nonsense for a start, as everyone 
recognises, because the two extremes meet somewhere be­
tween the thoughts of Chairman Mao and those of Balthazar 
Johannes Vorster.
But there is another division which cuts horizontally 
through the whole spectrum of social and political altitudes. 
It was first pointed out. 1 understand, by the American philo­
sopher, William James, who called the two ranges of attitude 
“tough-minded" and “tender-minded.” and the terms were 
taken up in the fifties by Professor Eysenck. The very ex­
pressive Afrikaans words verkram pte and verligw  express 
the notion very well. “Tender” left-wing attitudes are ones 
concerned primarily with increasing the power and the 
rewards of those with less; “tough" left-wing attitudes are 
chiefly interested in dispossessing those with more. Since the 
Second Vatican Council even the Vatican has its verkramptes 
and verligles.
“Tender" right-wing attitudes express a genuine concern 
for the freedom of the individual to make what arrangements 
he can for himself in this world; the “tough” aspect of the 
Right is the acceptance of the elites which this creates, and 
of their right to preserve and prosper themselves at other 
people's expense. In Rhodesia attitudes on race may be 
divided into these categories, tough and tender.
There are thus two axes along which men’s political position 
can be plotted -Right-Left and tough-tender. Professor 
Eysenck expressed this by locating them on a two-dimensional 
graph: -
tough-Left tough-Right
tender-Left tender-Right
1 can't remember whether Eysenck suggested it, but if we 
now bend the two-dimensional graph round to make a three- 
dimensional cylinder, we make a model which allows for the 
circularity of the political world noted above. Round the
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back, Mao and Vorstcr will be found at the lop of the cylinder, 
where tough-1 .eft and tough-Right meet. Below them, where 
the extremes of lender-Left and tender-Right meet, is the 
point where unrestricted laisse/ faire shades into anarchism. 
Here Mr. Unoch Poweii meets his L.ondon dockers.
Now all we have to do is rebuild the House of Commons 
on this cylindrical pattern a sort of Globe Theatre minus 
the stage, with the Speaker sitting in the middle of the pit 
and have candidates stand for election with a latitude and 
longitude after their names instead of a party label. But is 
this sensible or have we become a laughing stock?
It is not without some significance that the newer psycho­
political techniques have been developed in the United States 
of America, where institutional norms are much weaker than 
they are. say, in the case of Great Britain. The struggle to 
conceive of politics as a behaviourist and non-institutional 
study has been carried on with immense vigour in the U.S.A. 
They see politics consisting of a network of psychological 
actions and reactions, not to mention group analysis upon 
which de Tocqueville commented over a century ago.
In Britain, however, the case is different. The British 
have always struggled to fit and adapt themselves to their 
constitution--lo harmonise and overcome all political malaise 
in an accommodation to the living constitution; in the U.S.A. 
political scientists try to solve their problems by a critical, 
sometimes hypercritical examination of themselves. Hence 
American political scientists seek new structures and/or 
functions as they try to explain political behaviour. When 
Americans study African politics the results bear out this 
contention.
In Britain, on the other hand, one will always have to con­
sider that quaint amorphous utilitarian entity called the 
British Constitution. Indeed, it is wrong for the structural- 
functionalists to condemn traditional institutions per se. for, in 
the case of Britain, traditional institutions are still clearly of 
paramount importance. This may be the result of the
i f .
English “club" mentality (wherever three Englishmen meet 
they will form a club). Moreover, the English love institu­
tions. They have, for example, the Boat Race. Promenade 
Concerts, the B.B.C., Harrods, Foyles, Crufts, the British 
Museum, the Old-Boy network. Tottenham Hotspur and the 
Elephant and Castle -not that it rests here, for there arc 
institutions within institutions such as the State Opening of 
Parliament, and even institutions within institutions within 
institutions; the late Richard Dimbleby (himself an institution) 
once spoke of “loyal Big Ben." It is clear that the politics 
of mere behaviour has no chance in this context. Politics 
can never be in final travail in Britain as long as there is a 
Carlton C'lub. an Atheneum and a Transport House. In any 
case, the future of the House of Lords is assured as long as 
there are people willing to buy and to read and to believe 
in the Duke of Bedford's “Book of Snobs."
We have not yet exhausted the devices of the quantitative 
modernists. Let us therefore turn to international politics, 
where you will previously have heard about the intrigues of 
international diplomacy and the mysteries of the international 
underworld from Sir Neville Henderson to J. Bond. Esq., and 
all those brilliant diplomatic gatherings with beautiful, cham­
pagne-drinking women and unimaginably lavish Viennese-type 
glitter.
International politics is not like that today. Today we 
talk about Games Theory and Conflict Resolution, and we 
assess things like the probability of a World Order, using the 
most advanced mathematical techniques (it has been calcu­
lated. for example, that in the year 3750 A.D. the probability 
of a settled world is .99935)." Hence we have removed the 
romantic officer of the Foreign Legion, armed only with a 
small revolver and untrammelled courage, just as we have 
removed Tommy Atkins and Jack Tarr. Our ships are no 
longer Hearts of Oak and our Flying Officers do not even 
have to fly an aircraft. Instead, we talk about a meteorology 
of War and Peace a singularly un-Tolstoyian concept. We 
can plot the steps in a war build-up sequence to a large extent
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because of the work of Dr. Louis Fry Richardson, an Hnglish 
physicist, psychologist and mathematician and Quaker, who 
constructed mathematical models of arms races.
The simplest model of Richardson’s is described in Arms 
and Insecurity. In this model Richardson assumes that in 
a two nation arms race the change in defences of each nation 
depends upon three factors. The first factor concerns the 
“defences” of the other nation which. Richardson argues, do 
not appear as defences to the first nation. The greater the 
“defences” of the other nation, the greater the increase in 
defences of the first nation. Similarly, the greater the “de­
fences” of the first nation, the greater the increase in defences 
of the other nation, for the other nation does not view the 
“defences" of the first nation as defences.
To summarise the mathematical argument verbally: if the 
arms race is viewed as being a closed system with an open 
component, where the closed system is the exponential system 
produced by a damping force and an elastic force, and the 
open system component is represented by a series of inputs 
to the closed system, as the intervals between consecutive 
external inputs to the closed system vary, the behaviour of 
the total system can be influenced out of proportion to the 
external force.'1' Are you groping? I am.
Games Theory focused on diplomacy and war have been 
developed at MIT, Harvard, Columbia, North Western, 
Oklahoma. San Francisco Stale College and at the Army 
War College at Stanford. Games theorists therefore create 
states, call them actors and then play out the grisly pre­
liminaries to international conflict--the Berlin Air Crisis of 
1948-49 being a favourite. The simulation of war build-up 
to assess the points of potential conflict and their possible 
defusing has now reached a state of high development. In 
a series of control runs at North Western in the summer of 
1960, an attempt was made to discover what happens when 
nuclear weapons are used freely and loosely by all and sundry. 
In short, can the bomb go off by accident?
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11 is easy to criticise these developments on the frontier 
fringes of political science. Thus, for example, we might 
say these are only games and not the duplication of reality, 
but only its simulation, for simulators are only copy-cats and 
not participants. Moreover, a copy-cat calculus cannot tell 
us why the actors are not rational. The modern political 
strategists can, however, argue back when told that the arm­
chair strategist is equally useless as the laboratory strategist. 
It has indeed been proved in a laboratory that the less-trust­
worthy. one-nation team is in the eyes of the others in a 
given system, the more likely negotiation is bilateral rather 
than multilateral. Would the armchair strategists know this 
fact? Thus proceeds apace the study of conflict process, 
credibility measurements, sum-zero games and conflict re­
solution.
There are yet two further groups who have bombarded 
political science with their own particular contributions, the 
sociologists and the philosophers. While we have much to 
thank the sociologists for, in understanding modern political 
science, they have, in some respects, been an unhappy in­
fluence because they have taken the eyes of the student of 
political science away from ‘politics’ into 'society.' Of course, 
any student of elections must inevitably assess factors such 
as class, education, sex. age, religion, trade union membership, 
rural and urban living and family traditions. But the election 
studies today are so undramatic that they have removed the 
early, bright-eyed innocence, the decisive simplicity, the joy 
of victory and the sorrow of defeat the “poetry,” “hwyl" to 
use the word of the late Aneurin Bevan. from elections.
Moreover, those of us brought up in the tradition of the 
great political philosophers and the natural law school are 
sad to see our subject reduced to a number of sociological 
propositions which we are asked to verify in the field of the 
insignificant. We have been introduced to Talcott Parsons, 
but we suspect that he has “written as if society was a play 
with a definite script.” He is the high priest of what Pro­
fessor Mackenzie calls over-arching theory.11 This simply
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means that he is a systems-builder, but about this there is 
nothing very new. We may be forgiven if some of us prefer 
the craftsmanship of Thomas Aquinas to Talcotl Parsons 
in this respect.
Sociology (here used deliberately and not as a solemn 
rhetorical substitute for “social") was first utilised in the 
capacity of handmaid of political science by Aristotle, who 
sketched the growth of the polis from its social beginnings 
until its final teleological flowering in political life. Zoon 
politikon - man. said Aristotle, is a political animal. Genera­
tions of political philosophers, particularly the contractualists. 
particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were 
aware that the social state, commonly called the state of 
nature, was something from which one should remove oneself 
as quickly as possible. Citizenship was frequently seen as 
the superior condition to the social state. The category 
“citizen" was a superior category to the category “man": 
Zoon politikon. Man. as Leo Strauss interpreting Aristotle 
tells us. is the only being that can be concerned with self- 
respect; man can respect himself because he can despise 
himself; he is “the beast with red cheeks,” the only being 
possessing a sense of shame. There is a dignity of the public 
order: the political is su i generis and cannot be understood 
as a derivative from the sub-political.11 Zoon politikon.
These lesser sociologists who insist on a rigid interpretation 
of the political life in terms of society are missing the point. 
Political life is autonomous. The relationship between poli­
tics. the individual and society is reciprocal as well as 
complex. Thus the ex-colonial territories were “given" a 
political system “from above." in spite of their vast social 
differences. On the other hand, why has the “Westminster" 
model not appeared in Germany, which has had a broadly 
similar pattern of economic development to Britain since the 
last part of the last century?
A major objective of a sociology of politics lies in the 
defining of the circumstances and the extent to which polities
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of a country is influenced by general social conditions. The 
great danger which many of the greatest political sociologists 
of the past have avoided (amongst whom Montesquieu and 
de Tocqueville may be mentioned) is the over-simple reduction 
of politics to social structure. Not “class." not “religion,” 
not “income," not “family” none of these can adequately 
explain the political life.
Conversely, in rejecting the over-simple reduction of poli­
tics to social structure one should be cautious about the 
opposite fallacy -the “aristocratic" belief that general con­
ditions of society do not inlluence individual behaviour and 
that individuals are free to choose freely, rationally and ail 
the time, without reference to their working class origins or 
their bourgeois aspirations.
Without much of a struggle many of our professional col­
leagues have fallen too easily into the traps which the best 
of the discerning sociologists have avoided themselves. The 
political sociologist's antiseptic prose, sociologese. has been 
borrowed, with all its unfortunate results. We are currently 
being constrained to speak of “normativeness." “political 
factionalism" (or perhaps more happily because of its Greek 
derivation -stasisology to refer to political disagreement), 
“socialisation." “interest articulation and aggregation” and 
a host of others.
Yet more serious is the insistence on statistical, quantita­
tive answers to admittedly less exact but politically relevant 
questions. One wonders whether we can fairly accept this 
development, for. as one American writer, Morton Grodzin. 
has said. “The scientist who defines his technique first and 
his problem second has placed second things first.” Political 
sociology has overall been of immense value in helping us 
to understand many of the mechanical processes of politics, 
and most of these students today are busy gathering facts in 
a brave attempt to help or understand how “it all ticks.”
In his analysis of British political parties Professor R. T. 
Mackenzie has restricted himself almost entirely to describing
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the mechanics of the dominant political parties inside and 
outside parliament. He concludes that the chief function of 
the system is to produce two competing political elites between 
whom there is nothing to choose in the end. Having arrived 
at this conclusion 700 pages later, he set out to make all 
subsequent political developments lit his conclusions. On 
the other hand. Professor Samuel Beer thinks that ideas do 
count and that there is a specifically Conservative as well 
as Labour way of doing things. He will not agree that party 
politics is a soulless mechanical affair and he argues that 
much remains inexplicable, but in this way he throws us 
back into travail. We are just fundamentally ignorant about 
a great deal which we thought we could measure. Thus. 
Professor Mackenzie's psephotogical colleague. Dr. Butler 
of Nuffield College, Oxford, indicated, in tones of quiet re­
signation, that “No one, in the political game or out of it. 
really understands what moves voters.”
One young sociologist has asserted that political sociology 
has come to be a study of the “ways in which social struc­
tures set the limits of political action.” 1 regard this as a 
dangerous, deterministic heresy, a form of modern predesti- 
narianism. the annihilation of free will. Free will in politics 
is preferable to gloomy prediction. Political science was 
never, as economics was reputed to be. a dismal science.
Modern trends in philosophy have not given much comfort 
to the student of politics, and hence philosophy loo has 
promoted our travail. The pivotal assertion of the logical 
positivists and their successors was the verification principle. 
Everything was to be verified, with the possible exception 
of the principle itself, and every proposition was to be tested 
for its falsifiability. The aim of the linguistic philosophers, 
too. is not to see if a hypothesis is true, but to see if it is 
false. Hence, falsifiability not verifiability is the criterion of 
the scientific status of a theory.15 “The ideas of the logical 
positivists, namely, that metaphysical statements were non­
sensical and that a priori propositions were tautologies, were
immediately derived from Wittgenstein and Carnap, but they 
could easily be traced back to Hume.” 1"
The sum total of this activity seems to indicate that philo­
sophers in this century have not been averse in trying to 
destroy philosophy in so far as they will not discuss those 
things which one might have expected them to discuss. Hence, 
while we have had the anti-hero in the Theatre of the Absurd, 
we have also had the anti-philosopher one who could say. 
“what can be said at all can be said clearly (which I accept), 
and what we cannot talk about we must consign to silence 
(which I do not).” Not a word may be heard about “rights." 
“life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." “natural law” or 
“tyranny." The classical liberal who espouses modern philo­
sophical techniques is in travail indeed.
Most of the propositions and questions to be found in 
philosophical works are not false but nonsensical, so we are 
told; philosophy is supposed to be an activity rather than a 
body of doctrines, and the purpose of philosophy is seen as 
to ferret out and expose nonsense. A philosopher must, so 
to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up.
Hence we may not speak of any notion of political philo­
sophy. say the philosophers, but only of political scien ce, in 
the narrowest sense, by which is presumably meant that we 
may adduce propositions about the efficiency of the civil 
service, of the Supreme Court or the Fifth Republic. Witt­
genstein wished to take philosophy out of the university (in 
much the same way in which many people wish to take 
politics out of things), arguing that academic duties were 
boring as well as morally bad. The philosopher could never 
be an effective don. To teach philosophy was not to 
philosophise. A philosopher who teaches is a teacher, no 
philosopher.
One can understand, if one cannot approve of, this view, 
for in the case of politics to teach politics is not to be a 
politician. It would appear that in spite of the anti-philo­
sophers. people still do act as if the old issues were important.
and they still do have attitudes and political convictions. 
A. J. Ayer himself once wrote to me explaining why he could 
not lecture in South Africa, but it was the nineteenth century 
liberal who spoke, not the twentieth century Oxford philo­
sopher.
We have had little for our comfort from the existentialists 
either, because they too appear to speak several languages 
at once. Sartre presents us with a man for whom futility is 
the object of existence, but whose thinking at times resembles, 
it has been said, that of a nervous breakdown. The admission 
that “each one of our acts sets in motion whatever gives 
meaning to the world and decides the place of man in the 
universe.” unaccompanied apparently by any sense of the 
need to combine such acts (or perhaps of the possibility of 
combining them) in order to give them social as well as 
individual meaning, surely argued a moral defeatism of which 
“neutralism" was merely one facet. “Existence.” says Sartre, 
“is reasonless, causeless and unnecessary. We are born for 
no reason, go on living because we are weak, and our death 
is decided by chance."
On the other hand. Sartre can become immersed in his own 
version of Marxism, sometimes strangely mixed up with his 
own version of French revolutionary thought. His political 
move towards Communism he described as an old-time poli­
tical conversion. He said that. “En langage d’eglise, ce fut 
une conversion. . . . Au nom des principes qu'elle m'avait 
in culques. au nom de son humanisme et de ses ‘humanites.' 
au nom de la liberte. de I’egalite. de la fraternite. je vouai 
a la bourgeoisie une haine qui ne linira qu'avec moi."17
Political thought and action is under attack from all sides, 
and from the “outside" we are subjected to the vulgar clamour 
of the politically illiterate who see us as a subversive element. 
From the “outside." too. we are told that we perpetrate a 
fraud in advancing ourselves as political scientists. From 
the “inside" the political scientist is pressurised by fashionable 
new schools. Yet I would suggest that of all our sister subjects 
we rely most on economics and on history. In return we
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odor economists, (a belter term is political economist), contact 
with the realities of power, and to historians we offer the 
words of a great historian. Lord Acton, that political science 
is as “the grains of gold left behind in the river of history."
There is little obvious one can do to avoid the easy equa­
tion of free-ranging thought with danger for authority (linked 
in this part of the world with subversion), which is unfair 
and unfortunate. 1 had better therefore explain what I see 
political activity to be. Political activity is not intrinsically 
distinguishable from other types of human activity. What 
political activity refers to is an arena of activity rather than 
a type of activity. Thus, an issue may be thrown up 
whether about tariffs. education or the price of soap. The 
issue may be economic, social or a mixture of these and/or 
others. The mobilisation of opinion, the taking of sides 
over an issue, will soon compel recourse to weapons which 
will further the cause of the various protagonists. In short, 
means will be sought which give effect to power, “to produce 
a victory for one or other side.” At that moment in the 
progression it is possible to speak of something being 
“political." which means that we are in the sphere of ques­
tions of power, of ultimates. of final decisions, which fall 
short of force or of the military. All issues are thus potentially 
in politics. Zoon politikon.
Politics is mostly about power. It indicates the last stage 
in a dialogue which yet precedes the use of force. We are 
students, therefore, of power, of that area in human life in 
which it is necessary to take decisions. Politicians and poli­
tical scientists ask the question who gets what. when.
Political scientists students of political activity try to 
understand the science, in so far as there is one. of power. 
Politicians, the practitioners of political activity, try to gain 
power, such is the nature of their activity. We study, they 
do. Sometimes we study what they do, but we might very 
well be studying only one aspect of the arena of power. In 
this sense perhaps the most perceptive work on political 
science ever written was Machiavelli's Prince, which tried to
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present ihe would-be ruler with a formula for the successful 
acquisition and maintenance of power. Some writers feel 
that politics is more than being just about power. They may 
be right, but forget that fact and all other facts are not worth 
remembering.
In a recent biography of Lloyd George it was stated that 
what he wanted was power, and after that power, and after 
that power, and after that power. But one might just as 
well apply this to a successful business man, financier or even 
university vice-chancellor. Power is not the alpha and 
omega of politics, but it is more than half the story. The 
story of power is the story of politics and nobody can take 
this away from us not the pure scientists, not the lawyers, 
economists, historians. The story is told of the late R. H. 
Tawney. who sent a very young and keen research student 
to produce a bibliography on the idea of power. The list 
submitted was very comprehensive, but Tawney was horrified 
to see a section on hydro-electric power.
We alone possess this area for investigation, and we are 
in travail because some of our number do not realise it and 
some outsiders do not understand it. We stand apart in this 
respect from all the other social sciences. But what is this 
power? Is it ever attainable, tangible or even comprehensible, 
save in some mystic way? Is it “a windswept plateau attained 
by only a few men. and then only at the expense of others, 
a place where community status and power are concentrated?" 
Some describe the notion that power can be grabbed, as it 
were, in handfuls, as the “lump of power” fallacy, and have 
criticised the conception on the ground that power should 
not be conceived of as a “thing,” limited in amount and 
located by definition in any particular place in the social 
structure. 1 can only reply that most people will act as if 
the “lump of power" idea were a fact. Hobbes put this 
very clearly in Chapter V of the L eviathan,
Others, however, are more concerned with “instant" power, 
such as Mao. who asserted that power grows out of the 
barrel of a gun. Yet whether power is seen as a permanent
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or transitory tiling, it certainly merits close and prolonged 
study. Consider, for example, the case of West Africa."1
Professor W. A. Lewis said. “Philosophers like to see poli­
tics as a struggle between great principles, such as egalitarian­
ism or nationalism, or religion, or empire, but in most of 
the world today, and throughout history, politics has been 
nothing but a personal struggle for power between men who 
lust for power to use for their own purposes. That there are 
political bosses in West Africa is no more surprising than 
that there are political bosses in New York, or Glasgow, or 
Calcutta, or Bangkok. Neither is it unusual that men who 
profess such high ideals should at the same time be capable 
of much cruelty and corruption. It is normal for the power- 
hungry to hide behind the cloak of some great principle, such 
as religion, or nationalism, or socialism.”
“No politician will admit that he suppresses his political 
opponents primarily because he wants to stay in power, he 
will more usually say that their policies or their tactics en­
danger the country. Yet throughout history a personal love 
of power has been the prime motive of politicians, but not 
only them; interest in policy has been so minor that it is 
quite common to suppress an opponent today and adopt his 
policy tomorrow. Modern democracy, with mass parties 
tolerating each other’s opposition, is a very recent phenome­
non in the world's history, so recent that it would perhaps be 
more surprising if West African politicians had decided to 
work this system than that they should have decided against 
it."
How then do we study power, the substance of politics? 
We must firstly study theory. The oldest study with which 
we are concerned is the history of political thought. Twenty- 
five centuries ago Plato and Aristotle sketched the outline 
of the subject, introduced us to the seminal questions of 
politics and told us how to think politically.
Today, however, the subject falls into three main sections. 
The oldest, as an academic discipline, is the history of political 
thought. Generations of students have studied what Plato.
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Machiavelli. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau. Bemham and Marx 
had lo say about the State. Sometimes this course is jocu­
larly called the study of political ideas from Plato to NATO. 
There are occasions at the higher levels, i.e., honours and 
post-graduate levels, where students are asked what is their 
political philosophy, and they might be asked questions like. 
“Why must I obey the government?" rather than, “What 
did Rousseau say about government?" Broadly speaking, 
there are two main methods of classification. One can study 
the philosophers in chronological sequence or one can study 
concepts like political obligation, seeing what each particular 
philosopher added lo the concept. Both of these approaches 
has its own validity, but for me the most fascinating and. 
frequently, frustrating problem lies in the mapping out of 
the boundaries of a concept, for example, “Where does liberty 
end and equality begin?”
A second topic is the study of the machinery of government, 
either in a single country or comparatively. Most people 
would expect a political scientist to know how the United 
States Constitution works or of the politics of developing 
countries in Africa and Asia as well as more obvious under­
standings of the machinery of government in, say. France 
or Germany. Comparative government is perhaps the most 
interesting of all forms of political science because methods 
of approach in one country frequently throw a light on the 
methods in another. Many of our number become befogged 
in questions of method, trying to understand the grand frame­
work into which all species of political life can be fitted. 
Thus we have recently been asked to approach political 
systems with an input/output analysis which is of limited 
value, but even to make this remark is an approach to 
methodology.
What is certain, however, is that political scientists are 
moving away from the idea that political science is only 
very recent history—what some people call “instant history." 
In fact, many British departments of Political Science contain 
people who are really historians and nothing else. (We
must remember Joyce's cry, “History is a nightmare from 
which I am trying to awake.") In fact, our techniques of 
measurement are becoming sharper as time goes by.
These points also apply to the study of international rela­
tions. which is itself becoming a minor industry both inside 
and outside the Foreign Office, the State Department and 
the Quai d’Orsay. It must be remembered, in fact, that 
Rhodesia is somebody’s “international relation.”
The third, and newest, section of the subject is political 
behaviour, which suggests the conduct of the electorate, the 
effect of social structures on politics and. more narrowly, 
elections. I have already indicated that some modern writers 
concentrate exclusively on political behaviour, many of them 
because they see this as a way to make politics a science and 
hence to exclude the subjective elements.
Political science contains two elements in its very name. 
The first one. “politics,” might be described as a “boo” 
word— that is to say, many unthinking people regard it as 
something unpleasant. On the other hand, the second 
element, “science,” may be seen as a “hurrah” word- -that is 
to say. when we hear it we may feel obliged to cheer, par­
ticularly because science is “respectable” and politics is not. 
To anyone involved in the teaching of politics, one fact 
should be sacrosanct. He must not use his platform as a 
means of putting over one point of view. Hence one ought 
to have no fear that a lecturer would give a pernicious twist 
to his lectures, using Mill or Marx, simply because he was 
a Conservative or a Socialist respectively. He may very well 
come to the conclusion that either Mill or Marx (but hardly 
conceivably both) had discovered the secret of life, but he 
would be betraying his calling were he to be an instrument 
of indoctrination of any point of view.
Of course, a political scientist may decide that a particular 
point of view is unacceptable to him personally, but it is his 
duty to conceal his party loyalties. Clearly there are dangers 
in this, and political science could go the way of economics 
loo frequently concerned with respectable abstractions. What
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this means is that any economist has licence to begin every 
lecture by saying, “I leave all this to the government to 
decide; 1 simply give the advice without concerning myself 
as to the ethical implications.” Of course, the professor of 
political science should be alive to events, and it would be 
inconceivable to imagine one who was totally uninterested 
to discover who had won the general election. The whole 
object of his activities is to train students to analyse and to 
think, to be concerned with his subject.
Each person concerned with our subject will find himself 
torn, as was Plato, between the desire to embrace the world 
of action as well as the world of thought. We are often 
tempted to apply our thoughts to the present situation to see 
whether or not our researches could be of value. Sometimes 
a research problem will thrust itself in front of one. Thus, 
for example. 1 discovered the most fascinating thing about 
South African politics was the influence of certain pressure 
groups upon government policy and 1 felt obliged, for I was 
a political philosopher by inclination, to become an amateur 
political sociologist in order to understand the functions of 
these groups, like the Dutch Reformed Church, upon South 
African political structure. Again, about 15 years pre­
viously L found myself forced to enquire as to the actual 
conceptual meaning of the famous trilogy, “Liberte, Egalite. 
Fraternite.” This involved me in a seven-year search into 
the pamphlets circulating at the time of the French Revolu­
tion, on which are 47.000 books of tracts available for reading 
in the British Museum alone, not to mention the Bibliotheque 
Nationale. The research fields are limitless.
Further to this justification one is obliged to set out what 
one thinks the raw material of political science actually is. 
It contains three basic elements -men. words and ideas 
and in order to rescue political science both from its enemies 
and from its so-called friends—in other words, to remove it 
from its present state of travail, we recall these three basic- 
themes.
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Considering the first element, men, we might remember 
what was said by Lord Melbourne, a consummate, political 
animal. “Politics meant to me first of all personalities, and 
secondly, general principles.” We know all the chatter about 
charismatic politics, but this concept is no substitute for the 
painstaking evaluation of personalities. After all. it was the 
cult of personality which inspired the vituperative utterances 
of Khrushchev against Stalin in the famous secret speech of 
1956.
Kven at the vulgar level (I Hate Harold) the interest in 
people as people still remains a fundamental element, and 
without the evaluation of persons politics would be a very 
dead business. In this case we may consider a leading article 
in the Times of 30th March. 1968. which set up a four-sided 
personality comparison in which were featured Wilson and 
Jenkins as the modern version of Asquith and Lloyd George. 
“Lloyd George like Mr. Wilson was a wholly political poli­
tician. He was devious, he was an intriguer, he was per­
suasive, he was ruthless. As an orator he was considerably 
Mr. Wilson's superior, but. like Mr. Wilson, he rested his 
support on the radical section of his party while pursuing in 
office politics which veered steadily to the right. The parallel 
between Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Asquith is at least equally 
remarkable. Mr. Jenkins seems to have found a sufficient 
sympathy with Asquith to have chosen to be his biographer. 
Like Asquith, he is a politician of judicious temperament; 
his decisiveness is the result of a strictly controlled intellec­
tual process rather like that of a court of law. He depends 
on the support of the reformist rather than the radical element 
of the party. Like Asquith, he enjoys society as a contrast 
to work. Like Asquith, he is a conspicuous example of the 
Balliol intellectual in politics.” It was said to me by an 
old. canny, government official that policy files die quickly, 
but personality files never. Tt is not the policy which is 
pelted with rotten eggs and dead cats on the hustings; it is 
a rotten and moribund personality.
31
It was Hobbes who said. “. . . for words are wise men's 
counters, they do but reckon by them; but they are the money 
of fools."1" Nevertheless, we must be foolish or wise accord­
ing to taste and employ words in the ordinary language of 
political discourse. Words, however, are like empty bottles, 
but inside the liquid may vary. Thus we still tend to employ 
words the Greeks used like democracy, aristocracy, but we 
have discovered the limitations of using these words because 
they are frequently used as a weapon of war. The word 
democracy, to give but one example, is very much a word 
used in the armoury of political warfare. The Americans 
have spoken of their own system as the “world's leading 
democracy." but on the other hand the Chinese use the term 
democracy indicating that they have found the real thing. 
The term is sometimes offered for sale to bystanders as if 
it were some form of magic patent medicine which they 
might but drink in order to see the truth. In the same cate­
gory is the word republic which, in its original Latin, was 
res publica (common weal), but today seems to be nothing 
more or less than a condition where a monarchy is excluded, 
and in France in particular one could trace the cult of the 
republic as a national cause.
We are forced to use the chipped and debased currency 
of language, to employ words like “liberty,” “freedom,” 
“rule of law.” as if these still had some intrinsic meaning. 
“Few ideas are correct ones,” wrote Disraeli, “and what are 
correct no man can say: but with words we govern men." 
We are all perhaps becoming inhibited, because our vocabu­
lary is so threadbare. We observe the growth everywhere 
of euphemisms; words are used to give the impression that 
things are other than what they seem. Words become banners 
behind which march companies of the faithful. In a matter 
of weeks the word “parity" became either a rallying cry or 
a term of abuse, according to taste, in Rhodesia. Sartre was 
aware of the imprecise, incorrect or misleading use of words 
when he said. “While one speaks in one’s own language, one 
writes in a foreign language.”
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Words become sacred cows; they become in themselves 
enemy fortresses to be taken, citadels to be defended and 
the insignia of venerable tradition. You can “defend a 
system,-’ “create a revolution” and “develop a State” as the 
Communists have very well shown, only if the correct words 
are used. There pours out from the Communist world a 
torrent of words which must be used in the correct sequence
“revisionism,” “anti-party line.” “socialist realism,” “mass 
participation." “democratic centralism” and a host of others. 
But the West is not free from this disease either, and any 
glance at a typical first-year political science textbook on 
American government will illustrate that many of the claims 
about liberty, democracy are not always meaningful. The 
words of Dr. Johnson are always worth recalling. “Clear 
your minds of cant. You may say to a man. ‘I am your 
humble, obedient servant.' You are not his obedient servant. 
You say. These are dreadful times; it is a melancholy thing 
to be reserved to such times.’ You don't really mind the 
times. When a butcher says that his heart bleeds for his 
country he has. in fact, no uneasy feeling.”
It is with ideas, however, that we are mainly concerned, 
tivcry political system throws up its own ideology (which is 
itself an interesting example of a word which has been de­
valued, for it was invented in the 1790-s by Destutt de Tracy 
and quickly became a “boo” word). This is not to suggest 
that ideas are the product only of a given system. In fact, 
ideas had developed something of a life of their own. not 
perhaps as Plato would have imagined, but rather more a 
form of existence which at times pulls away from the anchor 
of reality. Tdeas do matter, as any student of the subject 
will affirm, and any good department of political science must 
burgeon with ideas otherwise its travail is grave.
In the end. then, two courses of research emerge for the 
serious student of political science—the study of political 
phenomena and the study of political claims. Political phe­
nomena here analysed relate to the push-pull of swarms of 
competing interest groups (farmers, teachers, industrialists.
shopkeepers, divines), all seeking to inlluence public policy 
in their direction, and with interlocking party structures above 
them. They present us with a condition which might be 
described as the pathology of politics. The very weight of 
these phenomena form a study in themselves of enormous 
significance, not only to the student of the social sciences, 
but also to the active politician.
As for the study of political claims, we are here faced with 
the problem of philosophical justifications, which is at the 
heart of the political dilemma. Claims are made in any given 
political situation for the rightness of any given course of 
action. A study of slogans, cliches, of political tag-words 
(in themselves a form of distillation of political discourse of 
a higher degree) serves to reveal how. so very often, action 
is justified IN THE NAME OF some superior ethic for actions 
which are intrinsically sub-ethical.
The political philosophy of claims is an area of study of 
immense significance to the political scientist as he patiently 
dissects the words, ideas, truths, half-truths and even lies of 
the claimant. The moulding of words to fit the situation, to 
justify the situation, to make a claim, this is the plastic 
material of the political scientist. Above its worst enemies 
the banner of liberty may be raised and the justification for 
an action may be found. The claim may be “no taxation 
without representation." or “rugged individualism." a view 
that one man in France, or a plea based on the presumed 
“natural rights" of man. or an assertion that one is protecting 
“civilisation” or even “Christian civilisation" when one may. 
jn fact, be doing no such thing.
“Reason." said David Hume, “is and ought to be the slave 
0f passions." This may not be the entire truth, but reason 
is clearly clouded by the passions. The justifier attempts to 
act first and justify second. As we try to peel away the layers 
of rhetoric, to discover the truth which lies beneath the 
ideology, we succeed in alienating the grandiose, the “claim­
ants who misuse political argument. It is a prospect replete
with travail. Responsibly, however, the work will continue 
breaking down the claims and the justifications. We must 
therefore apply ourselves to organise our knowledge of and 
then evaluate such things as legal systems, property arrange­
ments, ancient and irrational tradition, not to mention a whole 
portmanteau of sacred cows associated with the various 
constitutions of the modern world. Political science can 
proceed, in fact, only by way of the “arid monographs which 
can provide each separate statement with its whole apparatus 
of proof and ancillary hypotheses—in short, with concrete 
verifiability. ” 20
Undeterred, we set ourselves to solve our problems. Let 
us remember Marshal Foch: “Mon centre recule; ma droite 
est en retraite. Situation excellente. J’attaque!”
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